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Soon after the outbreak of the present war, the English courts found
themselves confronted with problems for the solution of which they
were compelled to look back to decisions reached at the time of the
Napoleonic Wars. For, although similar questions were ventilated
before the courts during the Crimean War, and were, so far as the
law of prize is concerned, treated with learning and distinction by
Lushington, it was yet inevitable, both by reason of the comparative
brevity of the Crimean War and of the conspicuous and overmastering
ability of Stowell, whose reign in the Admiralty Court lasted for
twenty-nine years (1798-1827), that the wide range of topics which he
treated, covering as they did every kind of mercantile transaction,
should become the classic authority for subsequent decisions. In
nothing is the greatness of Stowell more conspicuous than in his grasp
of principle; and the result is that to this day, notwithstanding the
greater variety, complexity and interdependence of commercial deal-
ings, notwithstanding the rapidity of communications and the rise of
the limited liability company, the principles which he evolved are still
true and applicable to the conditions of this war.
I. ALIEN ENEMY PERSONS
The status in judicio of alien enemies becomes an acute question
the moment the capacity of a plaintiff to bring his action is challenged.
How has English law defined an alien enemy, and under what condi-
tions may such a person sue in the courts? In the Anglo-American
system of law the test is now well settled; it is a test not of nationality
but of residence or commercial domicile, not what a man is but where
his business is. It may be well at this point to mention briefly some
of the older authorities to which the courts were able to turn when
they were first called upon, in the early days of the war, to form an
opinion on the question. In Bacon's Abridgement' the doctrine is
laid down that an alien enemy can sue in the king's courts only if he
is in the realm by license of the Crown. The same principle is fol-
lowed in Wells v. Williams.2 This is strictly interpreted in a later
case (of the Crimean War period); for it was held by Campbell, C. J.,
1 (th'ed.) Vol. 1, p. 183.
2 ,r-N& T A P- ,.* rF nIc9% Rn,,lin# Im Dn1,reo (iTo8') 2 Canbh. 16--.
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in Alcinous v. Nigreul that an alien born in Russia, resident in Great
Britain, though without the license of the Crown, could not maintain
an action for work and labour done. Lord Stowell laid down the
principle broadly in The Hoop4 that an alien enemy could not sue in
British courts unless under particular circumstances, such as his com-
ing under a flag of truce or some other act of public authority, which
pro hac vice would relieve him of his enemy character. The same view
is to be found in a case arising out of the South African war.5
This being, briefly, the trend of the earlier authorities, it is now to
be seen how they have been applied and developed by, the courts in
the present war. It is clear that the meaning to be attached to license
and residence requires close attention and definition. License, for
example, may be either express or implied. 'In most cases which arise
under modern conditions the license to reside is to be inferred from
a number of circumstances, such as the length of time for which the
alien enemy has resided or carried on business in this country. The
application of these principles to the conditions of the present war
was made in two important judgments. In Princess Thurn and Taxis
v. Moffiwt a writ had been issued by the wife of an alien enemy who
had been compulsorily registered under the Aliens Restrictions Act,
1914, and the Orders made theretinder. It was argued for the defense
that no action-could lie at the suit of an alien enemy registered as such.
Sargant, J., took the opposite view, and, indeed, based his judgment
for the plaintiff upon this very fact of registration.
"There can be no doubt," he said, "that the effect of such registra-
tion is to amount to at least a license to the Derson to remain in this
country. Inasmuch as the plaintiff is coming to insist on a right whichis individual to herself, she has in my opinion, by virtue of her registra-
tion and by virtue of the permission thereby granted her to reside in
this country, a clear right to enforce that right in the courts of this
country notwithstanding the existence of a state of war."
In Schaffenius v. Goldberg7 there is an important development of
this principle. An alien enemy had been interned under the Defense
of the Realm Regulations. He then entered into a contract with a
British subject that was in no way prohibited by any restriction relat-
ing to trading with the enemy. It was held by Younger, J., that the
interned alien could bring his action; and the arguments in opposi-
tion to this view and the reasons for which the court rejected them
are of such interest and and importance that they deserve a closer
inspection. The contention of the defense was that the plaintiff could
"(854) 4 EL & BI. 217.
' (i799) I C Rob. 196.
'Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd. [ixo2] A. C. 484.
[1915] 1 Ch. 58.
(Ex parte Liebmann) [i916] i K B. 284, 29o, 293,294.
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not bring his action, as the fact of his internment amounted to a revoca-
tion by the Crown of his license to reside. This argument was sup-
ported by a reference to a recent case, Rex v. Superintendent of Vine
Street Police Station;8 but all that this decided, as the court pointed
out, was the short point that an alien enemy interned in this country is
a prisoner of war, and for that reason cannot be granted a rule of
habeas corpus.
"Internment," said Younger, J., ""has not made the plaintiff an
enemy. Enemy character in a trading sense has never attached to
him"; and a little later in his judgment: "There has been a gradual
and progressive modification in the rules of the old law in their
restraint and discouragement of aliens. It is, as I have already indi-
cated, not the nationality, but the residence and business domicil of
the plaintiff that are now all-important. . . I can find no real warrant
for the contention that internment is equivalent to a revocation of the
licence to remain which is implied in registration."
The Court of Appeal upheld this view.
In the case discussed above the contract was entered into after the
outbreak of war. Where a contract was entered into between two
parties before the outbreak of war, and one of them became subse-
quently an alien enemy and was interned as such, his right of action
would a fortiori be unaffected; as was in fact decided in the unre-
ported case of Mayer v. Fink-Sibler,9 in which the writer was engaged.
I have discussed these cases at this stage because they provide a
good illustration of the way in which the license to an alien enemy
to remain is interpreted under modern conditions. We may take from
them the propositions that an alien enemy, that is, a person who is a
subject or citizen of a state at war with Great Britain, puts off his
enemy character for the time being and may appear as a plaintiff in
the English courts if there is clear evidence that he has the license of
the Crown to reside, such evidence being very strong in cases where
the Crown has contemplated and made provision for the continued
residence of alien enemies by making enactments for their registration
and internment, and where, in consequence, the alien enemy has in fact
been registered or interned. The case would be even stronger where
an alien enemy has, in pursuance of the prescribed procedure, made
application to the regular committee of the British Home Office'
0 for
an exemption from internment and has been granted such exemption
upon the condition that he produces sufficient sureties for his loyalty
and good behaviour.
[1916] 1 K. B. 265.
'Tried before Darling, J., i November, x915.
" This is strictly an Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State for
Home Affairs. It is a quasi-judicial body, and includes in its membership two
High Court Judges. It was set up in 1915.
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We are now in a position to consider the extent of the expression
"alien enemy" as used in the present war. Before it had become
necessary for the High Court to give its attention to the definition of
the term, a Proclamation was issued on September 9th, 1914, which,
although purporting to do no more than declare the common law (for
this is the utmost force that a Proclamation can possess), yet admirably
sets out the gist of the true doctrine. By sec. 3 the expression "enemy"
is defined as meaning "any person or body of persons of whatever
nationality resident or carrying on business in the enemy country,"
but does not include persons of enemy nationality who are neither
resident nor carrying on business in the enemy country. In the case
of incorporated bodies, enemy character attaches only to those incor-
porated in an enemy country.11 Sec. 6 provides that "where an enemy
has a branch locally situated in British, allied, or neutral territory,
not being neutral territory in Europe, transactions by or with such
branch shall not be treated as transactions by or with an enemy."
There can be no doubt that the sections just quoted correctly express
the conclusion to which a review of the common-law authorities would
lead. It was completely borne out by the judgment of the full Court
of Appeal1 2 in Porter v. Freudenberg,3 a decision of peculiar fullness
and authority. The court took occasion to travel outside the actual
question before it, and reviewed in an exhaustive and powerful judg-
ment the whole of the law relating to alien enemies. Their conclusions
are the same as those expressed in the Proclamation.
"It is clear law," said Lord Reading, C. J., in delivering the judg-
ment of the court, "that the test for this purpose is not nationality
but the place of carrying on the business."
And again:
"For the purpose of determining civil rights a British subject, or
the subject of a neutral State, who is voluntarily resident or carrying
on business in hostile territory, is to be regarded and treated as an
alien enemy .... "
By a further Royal Proclamation dated January 7th, 1915, territory
in the occupation of the enemy is treated as enemy country, and enemy
territory in the occupation of His Majesty's Forces or those of his
Allies is treated as friendly country. This is a rule of common sense
and requires no justification.
It may be taken, then, that Porter v. Freudenberg has finally decided
the question, Who is an alien enemy. It is clear from this case that
'The words in italics have a special significance, in view of a subsequent
decision of the House of Lords which I shall discuss at a later stage.
Consisting cf the Lord Chief Justice of England and six Lords Justices.
'i [19r5] i K. B. 857, 868, 86g.
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no person can properly be called an alien enemy (for the purpose of
suing and being sued) if he resides in this country by license, express
or implied, or if he carries on business here. On the other hand, all
persons are alien enemies, even though their nationality may be British,
who voluntarily reside in enemy country or in territory which is in
effective military occupation. For this purpose, and in this limited
sense, there is only one test, the test of residence -and business. There
is no other. It may, therefore, be truly said that the expression "alien
enemy" as used in and defined by the English courts for commercial
purposes is a highly technical expression, and bears an esoteric mean-
ing which to the layman may well prove misleading.
At this point, it will be well to consider the important question dis-
cussed by the court in Porter v. Freudenberg of the effect, if any,
upon English law of certain parts of the Hague Convention which
have been claimed as directly bearing upon the status of alien enemies
in civil courts in time of war. The Fourth Hague Convention of
i9o71 deals with the laws and customs of land warfare. It has been
signed and ratified by Great Britain. Section 2 of that convention is
headed "Of Hostilities." Art. 23 of that section sets forth a number
of acts of warfare which are prohibited to signatories of the conven-
tion, e. g., to employ poisoned weapons, to declare that no quarter
will be given, to employ arms, projectiles or material calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering. Subsection (12) of this article lays down
that it is forbidden
"to declare abolished, suspended or inadmissible the right of the sub-
jects of the hostile party to institute legal proceedings."
The opposing views may be very briefly put. It is the German con-
tention that this subsection constitutes a general prohibition against
any legislative measures which in time of war would place the subject
of an enemy state in the position of inability to enforce the execution
of a contract by recourse to the tribunals of the state in regard to
which he is an alien enemy. The English view (and it is believed that
this is widely shared in the United States) is that the subsection bears
a strictly limited application to occupied territory, and does no more
than prohibit the military authorities in command of such territory
from preventing access to the civil courts on the part of residents of
that territory. It is to be conceded that the German delegates at the
Hague Conference, who were in fact responsible for the introduction
of the subsection, plainly stated the intention and meaning which their
Government would attach to such a provision; and on the eve of the
outbreak of war, the German Ambassador in London made a personal
enquiry of the British Foreign Office regarding the legal status of alien
1 Pulling's Etnergency Legislation, Supp. 3, P. 547.
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enemies in the event of war. The Court of Appeal took the view
(though a decision on the point was scarcely necessary for the determi-
nation of the question before it) that the English view of the subsection,
according to which the interpretation it bears is the limited one relating
only to the rights of the inhabitants of occupied territory, was correct;
both on the general ground that the subsection was so placed in the
general scheme of the convention in which it is found that it must
have a strictly military application, and, more particularly, because a
prohibition against declaring suspended, etc., the rights of action of
alien enemies could have no relevance or meaning in regard to a
country such as England whose law operated automatically, on the
outbreak of war, to suspend the rights of action of subjects of hostile
states. The German Government made strenuous efforts, even up to
the last moment before the severance of relations, to press their view
upon the British Government, but unsuccessfully. But it is doubtful
whether the application of the English rule operates as unfavourably
against the 'subjects of a foreign state as the German Goveilment
seems to have supposed. It is the peculiarity of the English law of
alien enemies that it makes the test not nationality but domicile. The
Continental systems throw the stress on nationality. It follows from
this that not all German subjects, for example, are, according to
English law, alien enemies as such. This consideration is worth bear-
ing in mind; for it at once considerably restricts the area over which
alien enemy prohibitions operate. In short, the English rule does
little more than affect, either by renewal or suspension, the rights of
action of alien enemies (and in this must be included even British
subjects) resident in an enemy country at the outbreak of and during
war.
We may now pass on to examine some of the decisions in which
the status of "alien enemies" has been reviewed. The fundamental
principle is that the alien enemy cannot be the actor; he cannot
initiate or set in motion proceedings in the courts. Lord Reading,
C. J., has thus stated the rule :5
"When once hostilities have commenced, he cannot, so long as they
continue, be heard in any suit or proceeding in which he is the person
first setting the Courts in motion. If he had given notice of appeal
lefore the war, the hearing of his appeal must be suspended until
after the restoration of peace."
That is to say, that in any action in which he had been plaintiff, he
cannot begin appeal proceedings while an alien enemy; but if he is
not the actor, that is, when he has been brought before the court as
defendant, he may, even though an alien enemy, commence an appeal.
The right of alien enemies to defend an action appears never to
have been expressly considered and decided upon until the present
I Porter v. Freudenberg [1915] x K. B. 857, 884.
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war. On general principles, and in view of language used in regard
to the status of alien enemies by judges and text-writers which would
seem to-justify the conclusion that an alien enemy is totally ex lex, and
that he is simply nonexistent in the eye of the law, it might have been
not unreasonable to suggest that an alien enemy could neither sue
nor be sued. But it is clear that a disability to be sued may lead to
results repugnant to common sense and expediency. It was upon this
ground that Bailhache, J., based his decision in Robinson & Co. v.
Continental Insurance Co. of Mannheim.1" The point was taken for
the defendants that they could not be sued. The court took an adverse
view, Bailhache, J., stating the law as follows:
"But to hold that a subject's right of suit is suspended against
an alien enemy is to injure a British subject and to favour an- alien
enemy and to defeat the object and reason of the suspensory rule..
It is to turn a disability into a relief."
This admirably clear statement seems to commend itself to law and to
good sense.
The same result appears to have been reached'in American law.
17
It follows from the principles just stated that an alien enemy may
not counterclaim. ' For a counterclaim is in essence no more nor less
than a new and separate action which for purposes of convenience and
for the saving of expense is tried together with the main action; the
defendant who counterclaims is pro tanto the actor.
By the same reasoning, it has been held 9 that an alien enemy may
be sued where the cause of action arose after the outbreak of war
as well as before, but may not initiate a new proceeding by a third
party notice for indemnification; for this is distinct from, and not
incidental to, his right of defense.
Before passing altogether from the consideration of the status of
alien enemy persons, notice might be taken of London & Northern
Estates Co. v. Schlesinger,0 in which it was held by Ridley, J., that
an Order made under the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914, preventing
the lessee of a flat from residing in a certain place does not relieve him
from the obligation of paying rent to the lessor of a flat in that place,
taken before the war.
II. THE STATUS OF FIRMS AND CORPORATIONS
The rights in the English courts of alien enemy firms did not pass
without attention in previous wars. The matter generally arose out
z [1915] ; K. B. 155, 159.
"McVeigh v. U. S. (87) 11 Wall. 259.
"sCf. Porter v. Freudenberg and Robinson v. Mannheim Insurance Co., vide
suPra.
"By Ridley, J., in Halsey v. Lowenfeld [gi6] i K. B. 143.
[gi6] r K. B. 20.
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of the question whether a cargo of goods was seizable as prize or not.
A mercantile house might have one branch in enemy territory and one
in neutral or friendly territory; and the result would be that the goods
involved in the trade with the hostile branch would be confiscable, while
those involved in that with the neutral or friendly branch would not.
This question is, of course, quite distinct from that which is the subject
of this article, namely, the capacity of alien enemy persons, firms and
corporations for suing and being sued. It is mentioned only to show
that the problem of the commercial house with wide ramifications is
not new, and that principles were already to hand which could be
applied to the facts of the present war.
The result of the common-law authorities was expressed in the
Royal Proclamation of September 9th, 1914, which, inter alia, drew
attention to the illegality of trading with enemy firms and went on
to provide that
"where an enemy has a branch locally situated in British, allied or
neutral territory not being neutral territory in Europe, transactions by
or with such branch shall be transactions by or with an enemy."
It is true that this provision and the authorities which will be cited
are in strictness relevant only to the question of trading with the
enemy, with which this article is not concerned. But they are of
value in so far as they yield by inference the proposition that branchhouses not domiciled in enemy territory or in neutral territory in
Europe can maintain an action in the English courts, even though
other branches of the same business possess an enemy domicile. Thisprinciple was carried to some length in W. L. Ingle, Ltd. v. Mannheim
Insurance Co. 21 in which it was held by Bailhache, J., that where aninsurance company had a head office in Germany and a branch office
in London, transactions with the branch in London would not be
transactions involving trading with the enemy. The significance of
this decision lies in the fact that the friendly domicile prevails, even
though the domicile of the head office is in enemy territory. But on
the other hand, the case of Leader v. Direction der Disconto Gesell-
schaft22 may be compared, for it was there held that where the London
branch of a bank of which the head office was in Berlin was permitted
to carry on business according to the terms of a license given by the
Treasury under an Order made under the Aliens Restriction Act
which prescribed the way in which the assets were to be applied, an
English firm which had obtained a judgment could not issue execution
against the assets of the London branch. There is no conflict, how-
ever, between this case and that previously referred to, for the
Leader case may be regarded as a decision on the circumstances, .and
[igi5] 3 K. B. 227.[I915] 3 Y- B. 154.
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on the interpretation of the specific license under which the London
branch of the bank carried on business.
It can be said of these contemporary decisions on questions relating
to branch houses that they involve little or no departure from the
main principles enunciated by Stowell. It is a striking tribute to the
genius of that illustrious man that the foundations Which he laid
were so firm and comprehensive that on them has easily been reared
the intricate superstructure of modem commercial relations. The
limited liability company, however, is a recent growth; the conditions
and circumstances under which it carries on business are new; and
when there is added to this the complexity of international operations,
we are confronted with a legal problem of quite exceptional difficulty
which must be solved without any very great assistance from the past.
Little more will be done in this article than to endeavour to sum-
marize the law as it has been left by the now famous decision of the
House of Lords in Daimler Co. Ltd. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber
Co. Ltd.2 3 The whole question has been discussed by Dr. Ernest
Schuster in a paper read by him before the Grotius Society of England
and printed in the second volume of Proceedings at page 57, a paper
to which the writer is deeply indebted, and which is rich in learning,
acute in reasoning, and profound in thought. •
How is the commercial domicile of a corporation to be determined?
The question would become acute in a case where a limited liability
company was registered in Great Britain but was, in point of control,
entirely an enemy concern. English law has always very strongly
insisted upon the complete distinction between the corporation and
the persons (e. g., shareholders) who compose it. But a point might
be reached when the directors and shareholders resident in enemy
territories might exercise such a real control over the activity of
the company that the courts might be driven to examine the whole
basis of the idea of incorporation and to declare that a body sub-
stantially of enemy character should not defeat the legal incapacity
of alien enemies to sue by the technicality of English registration. I
shall endeavour to trace the stages by which the present doctrine was
reached.
The Proclamation of September 9 th, 1914, expresses negatively the
doctrine that the place of incorporation is the test of a company's
domicile, for it provides that
"in case of incorporated bodies, enemy character attaches only to those
incorporated in an enemy country."
At the end of 1914, the case of the Continental Tyre & Rubber Co.
Ltd. v. Daimler Co. Ltd. was before the full Court of Appeal,2 4 the
[1916] 2 A. C. 307.
[I915] K. B. 893.
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same court which decided Porter v. Freudenberg. The Continental
Tyre Company was registered in England; out of 25,000 ;I shares
one was held by the secretary, a naturalized British subject, resident
in Great Britain; the directors and all the other shareholders were all
German subjects resident in Germany. This company issued a writ
after the outbreak of war and obtained a judgment against the Daimler
Co. This was, therefore, an ideal test case. The Court of Appeal
(Buckley, L. J., dissenting) held that it could not look behind the fact
of the English incorporation in order to consider the nationality of
directors or shareholders. The company was, therefore, not an alien
enemy, and was entitled to bring its action.
The next case to be noticed is Rex v. London County Council, 5 an
authority not directly in point, but yet of some significance. The
council, as the statutory authority for the grant and renewal of cine-
matograph licenses, refused to renew the license of a cinematograph
company registered in England on the ground that the large majority
of the shares were held by alien enemies. Lord Reading, C. J., held
that the council were entitled in the exercise of their discretion to
refuse the renewal. The court put its decision upon the following
rather special ground:
"If the Council are of opinion that the exhibition of cinematograph
films accompanied by music should not be entrusted to a company so
largely composed of persons whose interest or whose desire at the
present time is or may be to inflict injury upon this country, can it be
held as a matter of law that the Council have travelled beyond the
limits allowed to them? I think not."
Before the House of Lords gave its famous decision when the
Dainiler case came to them from the Court of Appeal, Bargrave
Deane, J., in the Admiralty Court, considered the point in the case of
The Polzeah.6 He held, in determining the question where a com-
pany's principal place of business is situate within the meaning of
sec. i of the Merchant Shipping Act, i894, that
"to decide the true character and entity of a business or company you
must ascertain where the motive or directing force of the business or
company comes from; in other words, where the real life is, and not
where the limbs move to give effect to that living power.127
[i3915] 2 K. B. 466, 475. Cf. also Robson v. Premier Oil & Pipe Line Co.
Ltd. [1915] 2 Ch. 124, in which it was held that during war an alien enemy may
not vote in respect of shares in an English company, the right being suspended.1 [1916] P. D. 117 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal).
"Cf. The Tommi [1914] P. D. 251 and The Poona (1915) 31 TimEs L. R. 417,
i BR. & Cou. P. C. 275, in which- the President of the Admiralty Division
expressed a doubt as to right of companies composed of aliens to sue even
though incorporated in Great Britain.
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It will be noticed that in both the authorities just quoted there is
a current of opinion moving away from the strict doctrine of the
Court of Appeal in the Daimler case, that the determining factor in
deciding the domicile of a corporation is the place of its registration.
Attention is beginning to be paid to the quality of the persons who
compose the corporation in order to ascertain the real seat of its
activity.
Dr. Schuster's Grotius Society paper was read on May 3oth, 1916,
nearly two months before the judgment of the House of Lords in the
Daimler case. The learned writer, after a full consideration of the
treatment of corporations in foreign law, inclines to a view different
from that of the Court of Appeal, being of opinion that
tea corporate body should be deemed to be domiciled in the place of
its administrative centre, being the place at which the persons directing
the policy of the corporation habitually meet."
This is, in effect, the doctrine of "control" which was adopted and
expounded in Lord Parker's judgment in the House of Lords.
When the Daimler case28 came before the Lords in July, 1916, they
reversed the Court of Appeal, holding that the mere fact of registra-
tion in Great Britain does not of itself determine the domicile of a
limited company as English. But the appeal was allowed by some of
the Lords on a different ground, namely, that the secretary had no
authority to issue a writ. in the action. As this was all that was
relevant for the decision of the appeal, any excursion into the larger
question of the status of the company became, strictly, unnecessary.
But fortunately, a matter of such gravity and importance was not
passed over without comment. Lord Parker, in a judgment delivered
on his own behalf, and on that of Lords Mersey, Sumner and Kinnear,
discussed the main question, and laid down principles for determining
the domicile of corporations.
"It would seem, therefore, logically to follow," said Lord Parker,29
"that, in transferring the application of the rule against trading with
the enemy from natural to artificial persons, something more than the
mere place or country of registration or incorporation must be looked
at. My Lords, I think that the analogy is to be found in control, an
idea which, if not very familiar in law, is of capital importance and
is very well understood in commerce and finance. The acts of a
company's organs, its directors, managers, secretary, and so forth,
functioning within the scope of their authority, are the company's acts
and may invest it definitively with enemy character."
This judgment of the House of Lords may be taken to have estab-
lished that the status of corporations for purposes of suing is to be
1[g6] 2 A. C. 3o7.
[igi6] 2 A. C. 339.
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tested by the notion of control and no longer by sole reference to
the place of incorporation.80 But the difficulties which arise when
the doctrine is applied in practice are considerable. At which point
is it to be said that the acts of a company are under enemy control ?
The answer to this must vary with the particular' circumstances of
each case. Again, is this a question of law for a judge or a question
of fact for a jury? The answer to neither of these questions is
entirely clear. It seems safest to say that an enemy status can be
pronounced for only after the most careful examination of the con-
stitution and composition of the company in every case, regard being
had to all the circumstances before the court. Beyond this, it is not
wise to go.
It is hoped that the cases which have been discussed above will
illustrate the manner in which the English courts have applied them-
selves to some of the commercial problems created by the war. The
law in regard to the rights of actibn of alien enemy persons and
corporations may now be regarded as settled. The principles have
by now been fixed, and only their application remains. The indubitable
community between the English and American systems of law justifies
the writer in hoping that this article may prove not without interest
to American students and practitioners, who doubtless will be con-
fronted with similar situations to those which the English courts have
not unsuccessfully overcome. He cannot doubt that their treatment
in the courts of the United States will furnish a rich and lasting
contribution to the literature of this branch of that law which the two
countries have so largely in common.
FQllowed in In reHilcrees, 33 TiMES L. R. 28.
